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Abstract: This article examines Jacques Derrida’s work of self-reflection on his 
own teaching practice by using as a guiding thread the problematics of 
reproduction in the seminars of the 1970s. The first part of the article examines 
the sequence of seminars taught by Derrida at École normale supérieure from 
1971 to 1977 to show how the concept of reproduction is deconstructed by 
Derrida across several seminars. Derrida systematically demonstrates, across 
several themes and fields (sociology and economy, biology and sexuality, art, 
technique, ontology, and so on), that the critical recourse to the concept of 
reproduction (for instance, in its Marxist form) risks being complicit in the 
reproductive system it criticizes. The deconstructive motif of débordement is 
introduced to problematize this onto-logic of re-production. The second part of 
the article analyzes more specifically the unpublished seminar “GREPH, le 
concept de l’idéologie chez les idéologues français” (1974–75), in which Derrida 
examines the seminar function, his role as a teacher, and his own situation within 
the French educational system. In particular, Derrida offers a deconstructive 
critique of the reproductive effects of teaching, and of the institution of philosophy 
inasmuch as it functions as a reproductive machine. This work of deconstruction is 
done in the seminar notably through readings of Marx, Engels, and Althusser, 
with special attention to the concepts of ideology, reproduction, and sexual 
difference. 
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“Now, in the work that awaits us, we must be suspicious of all forms of reproduction, 
and the resources of such reproduction are powerful and subtle.” 
Jacques Derrida, “GREPH, le concept de l’idéologie chez les idéologues français” (1974–75) 
 
“The concept of re-production is barely conceivable.” 
Jacques Derrida, “La vie la mort” (1975–76) 
Intro/ductions: What Happens in the Classroom (Does Not) Stay(s) in 
the Classroom 
In this article, I want to point to a series of problems or difficulties related to the 
study of Jacques Derrida’s seminars, whether we study them in the archives or in 
the form of published volumes.1 One of the problems I want to bring out concerns 
the temptation to read the seminars as proper “books” in and for themselves. This 
temptation partly results from the fact that most of Derrida’s courses are entirely 
written out and, as a matter of fact, many seminar sessions across the decades 
 
A first version of this essay was presented in June 2019 at the University of Salerno, 
during the conference “From the Archive: Reading Derrida.” I am grateful to Francesco 
Vitale for his invitation, his hospitality, and his friendship. I also want to thank all 
participants for their comments and suggestions; in particular, I want to thank Peggy 
Kamuf for her invaluable engagement and her encouragements. This research has 
benefited from the support of ANID/FONDECYT. 
1 For more information on this publication process, itself involving a complex logic of repro-
traduction, see Adam R. Rosenthal’s inspiring introduction to this issue. 
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were extracted from their pedagogical context, revised, and published in one form 
or another in the course of Derrida’s life. Nevertheless, even though it is always 
possible—and sometimes fruitful—to read such or such course in isolation, as a 
“book,” I want to bring out the type of erasure that might result from such reading 
strategy. Not only does it tend to erase the singular performativity of the 
pedagogical scene, constraints related to the historical-institutional context of said 
scene, as well as the textual and literary dispositives specific to the seminar form 
and to the “genre” of the philosophy course. But—and this will be my main claim 
in this article—it also erases the fact that what we call “the seminar” is always 
both singular and plural: the seminar(s) in question also participate(s) in a teaching 
sequence supposing a certain seriality, a certain technicity and reproducibility 
involved in its/their fabrication, one which produces, from one seminar to the 
other, from one year to the next, effects of return, repetition and/or anticipation, 
continuities and/or ruptures on which Derrida as a teacher implicitly or explicitly 
capitalizes.2 From this law of differential seriality (which is, also, the law of text, 
text as law), patterns, echoes, and leitmotifs might emerge, offering themselves to 
interpretative reading—even though the event “itself,” the singular pedagogical 
scene that brought them about, forever remains inaccessible. In reading, we 
attempt to represent something which eludes representability; we attempt to 
reproduce something which escapes reproducibility. 
In order to give a better account of the difficulties I have just described, I 
will use as a guiding thread Derrida’s deconstructive analysis of the “logic” of 
reproduction (or, as he often styles it, “re-production”) in the 1970s seminars. In 
 
2 I’ll give just one example of this type of explicit internal-external renvoi from one seminar to the 
other—one which directly concerns our topic: ideology and re-production. In “La vie la mort” 
(1975–76), Derrida refers to the seminar “GREPH, le concept de l’idéologie chez les idéologues 
français,” which took place the previous year (1974–75): “Once again re-producibility is not an 
accident that supervenes upon production but the very essence of production. This is also very 
clear in the passages from Capital that we read together last year concerning ideology” (Derrida 
2019a: 141; 2020: 103). 
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the last part of this article, I will focus on Derrida’s reading of re-production in 
one specific course: the unpublished seminar “GREPH, le concept de l’idéologie 
chez les idéologues français” (1974–75), wherein the question of reproduction is 
most explicitly connected to the problem of pedagogy and education, and more 
particularly to the teaching of philosophy understood as contributing to 
socioeconomic and ideological conditions of social production and reproduction. 
When one studies Derrida’s work of self-reflection about his own teaching, as we 
are attempting to do here, from “within” the classroom, the “GREPH” seminar 
might indeed seem to constitute a privileged entry point. It took place in the years 
1974–75, in the wake of the creation of GREPH (Groupe de recherches sur 
l’enseignement philosophique). The GREPH association was officially founded 
during its first General Assembly on January 15, 1975, but its constitution was 
preceded by several preparatory meetings that took place in 1974. Derrida was 
one of the main (and most famous) organizers of the group, which also included a 
variety of high school and university philosophy professors such as Sarah Kofman, 
Roland Brunet, Michèle Le Doeuff, Jean-Luc Nancy, and many others.3 
GREPH’s main objective was to study “the connections that exist between 
philosophy and its teaching” (Derrida 2002: 97) and to re-inscribe the teaching of 
philosophy within “the historical and political conditions and functions of the 
teaching system in general” (ibid.). But, in more general terms, the group also 
aimed to interrogate the ways in which the philosophical institution, the teaching 
of philosophy, and the forms taken by the school system and the university are 
articulated to power, to the general structures of society and the state, and to the 
forces that make up their sociopolitical field of inscription: 
How is the didactico-philosophical inscribed in the so-called instinctual 
[pulsionnel], historical, political, social, and economic fields? 
 
3 For a historical overview and a description of GREPH’s objectives, see Derrida 2002: 92–98 and 
Orchard 2010. 
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How does it inscribe itself there, that is, how does it operate and 
represent—(to) itself—its inscription, and how is it inscribed in its very 
representation? What are the “general logic” and the specific modes of this 
inscription? Of its normalizing normativity and of its normalized normativity? 
(Derrida 2002: 93–94; 1990: 148) 
In the wake of the events of 1968, the members of GREPH aimed to interrogate 
the apparent objectivity and neutrality—in axiological and sociopolitical terms—
of the French philosophical institution. Notably, they advocated for a better 
understanding of the conditions of employment and recruitment regulated by the 
Capès and agrégation concours, and of their effects on the reproduction of the 
educational orthodoxies and ideological consensus that made up the dominant 
(institutionally legitimate) philosophical scene of the 1970s. One of GREPH’s 
flagship propositions was to extend the teaching of philosophy (until then reserved 
to the terminale students) to the three levels of high school, and even to younger 
pupils. From 1975 onward, GREPH’s initiatives crystallized around the 
contestation of the so-called Haby reform, which contributed to give more 
visibility to the group’s political-institutional engagements and made them popular 
with a broader audience of philosophy professors, students, and a portion of the 
general public (Orchard 2010: 46–78). 
All these political and institutional aspects surely infuse the 1974–75 
seminar that bears the name “GREPH, le concept de l’idéologie chez les 
idéologues français.” However, it is important to stress that this seminar was by no 
means used by Derrida as a political tribune or as a showcase for GREPH’s 
engagements. The seminar was, to all intents and purposes, a course of 
philosophy, continuing the sequence of seminars which Derrida gave every year at 
the École normale supérieure (ENS) from 1964 to 1983. For this reason, it obeys 
the same rules as the other seminars of the same period: it follows a certain matrix 
and complies with a number of constraints—temporal, spatial, institutional, and 
so on. For example, just like every seminar, this one comprises a certain number 
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of sessions, which requires adopting a certain cadence or rhythm, made of 
interruptions and sudden accelerations. The folder of the seminar stored in the 
archives includes nine sessions entirely written out (typed on a typewriter), but 
Derrida mentions that additional sessions were hosted by other participants.4 Most 
decisively, during the years he taught at ENS, Derrida was required to adapt the 
topics of his seminar to the notions au programme, that is, the themes assigned each 
particular year to the students-agrégationnistes. These themes were imposed on him 
as part of the nationally centralized program of the agrégation de philosophie and 
differed every year. These institutional constraints partly determined the authors 
and concepts addressed by Derrida in his classroom, which resulted in the 
incredible variety of questions and themes discussed in the seminars of those 
years.5 In 1974–75, the theme of agrégation was “society.” 
I will return to the “GREPH” seminar and to Derrida’s analysis of the 
Marxist critique of socio-economic-ideological re-production in the last part of this 
essay. First, I want to make an additional remark relating to the law of seriality 
exposed above. It is important to note that in the years leading up to the 
foundation of GREPH (and the following ones), Derrida expressed many times, 
and very explicitly, his frustration regarding the constraints of the agrégation 
program and more generally the repetitiveness and conservatism of the 
philosophical institution. In this sense, the “GREPH” seminar does not constitute 
 
4 Notably, Pierre Bourdieu presented between sessions 6 and 7 a synthesis of his famous 
sociological critique of Heidegger’s “political ontology”—which is also a critique of the ideological 
nature of philosophy in general. A first version of Bourdieu’s intervention was published in 
November 1975 as “L’ontologie politique de Martin Heidegger” in Actes de la recherche en sciences 
sociales (Bourdieu 1975). A modified version was published in book form in 1988, in the wake of the 
“Farias affair.” An English translation of Bourdieu’s book was published in 1991 (Bourdieu 1991). 
5 To give a few examples related to the period I will examine in this article, the themes imposed by 
the agrégation program were: le droit, la politique (1971–72), religion et philosophie (1972–73), l’art (1973–
74), la société (1974–75), la vie et la mort (1975–76), and so on. Each year, the agrégationnistes are thus 
required to study more particularly an entire field or subfield of philosophy. Despite numerous 
modifications in the protocols of the agrégation, this tradition has survived until today. For instance, 
the notion au programme for the year 2019–20 is la représentation; and for the year 2020–21, le commun. 
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an isolated exception, although the deconstruction of the educational system 
indeed takes center stage in 1974–75. In several seminars of the early 1970s, 
Derrida had already denounced the philosophical institution’s functioning as a 
reproductive machine, explicitly exposed the limitations of the seminar form, 
exhibited his own situation as a teacher, and displayed on stage the frustrations 
that these institutional constraints provoked in him.6 What became the central 
“theme” of the “GREPH” seminar, in 1974–75, had thus already been touched 
upon, and somewhat performed, in previous seminars. 
For all these reasons, before analyzing the seminar “GREPH, le concept 
de l’idéologie chez les idéologues français” in more detail, I want to consider more 
broadly the sequence of the 1970s seminars. My claim is that Derrida’s explicit 
deconstruction of the educational system to which he belongs is inseparable, in 
those years, from a more general concern with the “logic” of production-
reproduction, of re-production, in the field of education and beyond. In the 1970s 
seminars, the question of re-production in fact constitutes a motif in the pictorial 
or musical sense—a recurring mark or trace, re-produced from one year to the 
other, which connects many of these seminars despite the exorbitant variety of 
themes, authors, and concepts they address. As we shall see, in these seminars the 
motif of re-production, the conceptual logic associated with the notions of 
production-reproduction, brings together fields of inquiry, concepts, authors, or 
problems that seem to have very little in common but that Derrida insists in 
 
6 Two examples: The seminar “Religion et philosophie” (1972–73) begins with a violent critique 
(four pages entirely written out) of the agrégation concours, and of the teaching conditions it imposes 
on philosophy teachers and their students (Derrida 1972–73). Those four pages constitute a sort of 
preamble to the course; they are thematically and materially separated from the rest of the 
seminar. In contradistinction, the following year, the introduction of the seminar “L’art (Kant)” 
(1973–74) outlines a series of protocols that prefigure GREPH’s concerns; but those are seamlessly 
woven into the general problematic of the seminar—that is, a deconstruction of the self-accredited 
sovereignty and totalizing systematicity of philosophy (of its discourse and its institution), which 
gives itself the authority to legislate over a supposedly subordinate “field” or “subfield”: art, artistic 
production, and aesthetics (Derrida 1973–74: session 1). 
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reading alongside each other: fields such as family and society, law and politics, art 
and aesthetics, economy and sociology, the institution of philosophy, culture and 
ideology, biology and genetics, sex and sexuality, technological re-production, 
education and pedagogy, and so on. Despite their apparent diversity and 
heterogeneity, all these seemingly “regional” fields or subfields of theoretical 
inquiry recur to the conceptual logic of production-reproduction, and this is what 
justifies that they can be read together, albeit in very different contexts, and on a 
pedagogical scene that is each time singular. For this reason and others which will 
soon appear, the question of re-production is of course more than a mere 
example: the “logic” of re-production is precisely one of the main targets of 
Derrida’s teaching practice, and arguably of deconstruction in general. 
Re/pro/tra/ductions: Débordements 
Roughly speaking, the sequence I want to talk about starts in 1971 and ends in 
1977. Every year, from 1971–72 to 1976–77, Derrida reproduced, each time 
differently, the motif of re-production and adapted his deconstructive reading to 
the theme of each year’s seminar—usually in tune with the theme imposed by the 
program of agrégation. Each year, the tune was played very differently, in a different 
key. Let me describe this sequence in very schematic terms.  
In the 1971–72 seminar “La famille de Hegel” (subtitled, in the seminar’s 
typescript, “Introduction à Hegel”), Derrida interrogates the Hegelian conception 
of family and the resources of its production and reproduction in and through the 
objective spirit—chiefly the law and the state (Derrida 1971–72). In the years 
1971–72, the program of agrégation was le droit, la politique. In the seminar, which 
was later revised and reproduced in Glas, and which makes up, roughly, the first 
two thirds of its first column, Derrida shows that Hegel’s dialectics of family and 
the state require sexual difference as difference, but only to reduce it to a simple 
contradiction and Aufhebung, a mere oppositional moment to be sublated in and 
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through the general process of self-reproduction of the spirit. The philosophical 
logic of the Concept and its “re-production” works in reducing sexual difference 
through the phantasm of Immaculate Conception. The following year (1972–73), 
Derrida deconstructed the resources of this re-production in the passage from 
religion to philosophy—the seminar’s title, “Religion et philosophie,” reproduces 
exactly the theme of the agrégation’s program. There, Derrida reads Hegel through 
Marx’s, Freud’s, and Kant’s theories of ideology, fetishism, and religion. In the 
1973–74 seminar “L’art (Kant),” which is presented as a possible treatment of the 
agrégation theme l’art, Derrida focuses a lot of energy in deconstructing the 
opposition between production and reproduction—particularly in the form of 
“productive” versus “reproductive imagination” in Kant’s third Critique. I will 
return to the 1974–75 seminar “GREPH, le concept de l’idéologie chez les 
idéologues français” in the last part of this essay. We will see that the concepts of 
production-reproduction and sexual difference play a decisive role in it. This is 
also the case in the 1975–76 seminar “La vie la mort,” wherein Derrida proposes 
a very detailed deconstruction of the logic of re-production (deemed sexual or not) 
in the life sciences—chiefly through a deconstructive reading of biologist and 
geneticist François Jacob’s definition of life as self-reproductive. 
One could argue that the quasi-obsessional recurrence of the motif of “re-
production” in the years leading up to GREPH and the following ones relates to 
Derrida’s growing attention to his own practice as a teacher, and to an effort to 
analyze how one’s own teaching might contribute to produce or reproduce the 
system in which this practice inscribes itself. But it is also important to note that 
Derrida’s apparent obsession with the logic of re-production also illustrates 
another type of frustration, caused by the quasi-omnipresence of the concepts of 
production and reproduction on the contemporary intellectual scene. Derrida 
expresses this frustration several times in the 1970s seminars, most explicitly in the 
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“GREPH” seminar (1974–75) and in “La vie la mort” (1975–76).7 As is often the 
case, this frustration is made more explicit in the seminars than in the publications 
of the same period—although Derrida is quite clear in denouncing the vocabulary 
of “production” in the interview “Ja, or the faux-bond,” which took place in 
October 1975, exactly between the seminars “GREPH” and “La vie la mort”: 
To produce, that is the big verb today.8 
And production is the all-purpose concept, just indeterminate enough 
around the edges [sur les bords] to move in everywhere where other notions have 
been disqualified: notions like “creation,” “causality,” “genesis,” “constitution,” 
“formation,” “information” (of a material or of a content), “fabrication,” 
“composition,” and many more still. (Derrida 1995: 37; 1992: 44) 
In the same interview, Derrida goes on to explain that, while the term production is 
supposed to replace other concepts that are now widely considered as too 
theological, ideological, or metaphysical, thus contributing to give a scientific gloss 
to the discourses which make use of it, it also risks making “the metaphysical 
determination of truth” “return in full force” (Derrida 1995: 37). There, Derrida 
notably refers to Althusser, Foucault, Bourdieu, and Deleuze without naming 
them. All these authors use the conceptuality attached to production-reproduction 
to exceed (déborder) a certain metaphysics without, however, interrogating the 
philosophical provenance of this conceptuality. But—Derrida asks—what does 
this onto-logic of re-production reproduce, in and through this very débordement? 
 
7 “Where one can no longer say create (because only God is supposed to create and we are done 
with the theological), one says produce; where one can no longer say engender, express, think, and 
so on, where some concept is seen—and rightly so—to be importing too much from some dubious 
metaphysics, theology, or ideology, one calls upon producing to replace or neutralize it. You know 
that today one does not form a system or a theory or a concept, one does not conceive a concept, 
one does not express something; one produces a system of knowledge, one produces an utterance, 
one produces a theory, one produces an effect” (Derrida 2019a: 136; 2020: 99). 
8 The French original—“Produire, c’est aujourd’hui le verbe”—parodies theological parlance: “Au 
commencement était le verbe.” Derrida thus seems to suggest that the concept of production 
carries with it (reproduces, perhaps) a certain religious motif, and maybe a creationist streak. 
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It is probably in the recently published seminar “La vie la mort” (Derrida 
1975–76; 2019a; 2020) that the deconstruction of the strange and complicated 
logic of re-production is most developed. Please allow me to select and reproduce 
a series of quotations from the seminar9—“select” and “reproduce” because, as 
Derrida explains in the seminar, these two gestures are at once incompatible and 
inseparable: “Selection and reproduction form a pair [un couple] of concepts whose 
association is for us as enigmatic as it is necessary. . . . How can a reproduction be 
selective? This is as difficult to think as the contrary: how can a reproduction not 
be selective?” (Derrida 2019a: 84–85; 2020: 57). This is what makes the concept of 
re-production “barely conceivable,” “à peine concevable” (or only conceivable, 
precisely, as phantasm of pure—immaculate—conception). Pure reproduction is 
unthinkable, just like pure production, of which reproduction is supposed to be the 
re-production. These difficulties have to do with the logic of the self, the ipseity 
which cannot be, other than by being itself its own re-producibility: 
Hence the reproduction of self reproduces that which (itself) already exists. But, 
here, what already exists is the effect of a reproduction of the self. Of another self, 
the same. No matter how far one goes back, one will not find a reproduction that 
does not re-produce a re-production. An absolute production of self produces a 
self that is a (living) self only to the extent that and only insofar as this originary 
and living production is produced—produces itself—as reproducibility. The self 
of “producing itself” is already, in its identity, reproducibility; without this, it 
would have no identity. The identity of the self or of the self with itself [de soi à soi] 
is a certain reproducibility. (Derrida 2019a: 134; 2020: 96–97) 
Derrida thus highlights the aporias of ontology, of an “onto-logic” on which the 
logic of production-reproduction is dependent: 
One must therefore think the re-production of self otherwise, other than as that 
which comes after the fact to complicate a simple production. Producibility is 
from the very start re-producibility, and re-producibility is reproducibility of the 
 
9 These reproductions are in fact translations—repro-traductions—by Pascale-Anne Brault and 
Michael Naas. I can’t thank them enough for their patient work of translation. Translators give the 
text the chance of a supplementary sur-vival, of a repro-traduction in life death, beyond “life” and 
“death,” beyond production or reproduction (see notably Derrida 2020: 117). I’ve slightly modified 
the translation in rare occasions. 
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self. But since the self is not before this capacity to reproduce itself, before its own 
re-producibility, there is no self-sufficiency or pure spontaneity before its 
production as reproduction, before its reproducibility as re-producibility. It is its 
reproducibility. (Derrida 2019a: 134; 2020: 97) 
To be is to be reproducible. It is thus important to keep in mind that this complicated 
schema of production-reproduction (reduction, selection, re/pro/duction, and so 
on) is in fact required by the logic of the self and by the onto-logic of presence. It is 
this logic. In sessions 4 to 6, Derrida refers numerous times to Hegel to expose 
what this whole logic of re-production owes to Hegelian dialectics, often through 
the influence of Marxist terminology—an influence that Derrida considers 
decisive (Derrida 2019a: 136–43; 2020: 99–105). In session 5, Derrida explains 
that the logic of re-production, and in particular the “concept” of production, 
provides the empirical-scientific discourse (be it that of biology, sociology, 
economy, history, and so on) with a “support,” a basis on which its accredited 
scientificity relies. But this “support” (the concept of production) remains in itself 
uninterrogated as a philosophical object, as philosopheme: “this support is obviously 
a philosopheme (the determination of being as physis-technē-alētheia-life, 
manifestation-information: production of essentiality as maximal re-production of 
self, presentation of self—for what does to produce mean if not to present—etc.)” 
(Derrida 2019a: 143; 2020: 105). The logic of re-production thus supposes a 
certain metaphysics of presence, an ontological discourse on the truth of being 
which functions by presupposing the presence of what is being re-produced, while 
erasing its own heterogeneity. This discourse posits itself by positing the 
homogeneity and identity of the object that is being “produced” or “reproduced,” 
in the form of presence—in short, “presented.”  
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In the sixth session of “La vie la mort,” Derrida proceeds to complicate this 
onto-logic by pointing to translation and text, and by speaking about “repro-
traduction” (repro-translation):10 
the text begins by its translation [traduction] or its description or its 
reproduction. . . . Without the translating event there would be nothing to 
translate [traduire]. Without the event of trans-lation [tra-duction] or of re-
production there would be no product and no production. . . . Here the event is a 
text . . .; it is a text-event that reproduces itself, that is to say, that takes itself as a 
referent, that has as a reference a text, and that not only reproduces itself but also 
induces itself as reproduction, begins by its reproduction, its repro-traduction. 
(Derrida 2019a: 156–57; 2020: 116–17) 
And shortly after: 
Naturally, this textual self-reference, this closing upon itself of a text that refers 
only to text, has nothing tautological or autistic about it. On the contrary. It is 
because alterity is there irreducible that there is only text; it is because no term, 
no element, is itself sufficient or even has an effect, referring as it always does to 
the other and never to itself, that there is text; and it is because the whole that text 
is [l’ensemble texte] cannot close upon itself that there is only text, and that what is 
called the “general” text . . . is neither a whole nor a totality: it can neither 
comprehend itself nor be itself comprehended. But it can be written and read, 
which is something else. (Derrida 2019a: 159; 2020: 118) 
From the point of view of re-production, this law of general text implies two 
things. First, the text that is being interpreted—and here “text” covers a field of 
experience that is virtually unlimited, implied everywhere differantial traces are 
involved—must be read, that is, it must be legible, decipherable, and therefore 
reproducible; it requires models that will determine its legibility, representability, 
 
10 The question of translation as repro-traduction is also addressed in the seminar “Walter Benjamin.” 
The exact date of the seminar is uncertain, but in Parages, Derrida mentions that it was given “in 
1974 or 1975” (Derrida 1986: 211). It does belong to the sequence I am describing here. On page 
2 of the third (and last) session of the seminar, Derrida asks: “Is translation [traduction] a production 
or a reproduction? The problem of production and reproducibility has been the most continuous 
thread of our reading for three sessions; and it has seemed necessary to me to follow it if we must, 
as has been our program, interrogate ourselves about a Marxist theory of culture” (Derrida 1974–
75 [exact date uncertain]: session 3, page 2; my translation). 
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and reproducibility in the form of truth-making discourse.11 However, this work of 
decipherment and the models it re-produces must also select, reduce, and thus 
cannot fully “produce” or “reproduce” their object of inquiry. The scientific or 
philosophical (ontological) discourse is always somewhat analogous to the text it 
reads; but it is a priori exceeded, overflowed by the text, in which it partakes. The 
law of text thus signifies a certain inescapability of reproduction or reproducibility, 
but quite as much that of an excess, an overflowing, the radical heterogeneity of 
an absolute unproductivity, of what remains irreproducible while, however, being 
at work in all the analogical models we are talking about here. The reading of a text 
(in the “general” sense that Derrida gives to these terms) is neither simply 
“production” nor a simple “reproduction.” 
It follows from this overflowing law of irreducible heterogeneity that the 
so-called biological field cannot be defined as totality. It becomes extremely 
difficult to circumscribe: “more than once we have come to see that it is difficult, 
and for essential reasons, to limit or delimit the biological field, that this field is its 
very overflowing [son débordement même], that overflowing [le débordement] is its 
structure” (Derrida 2019a: 182; 2020: 139). This law of débordement is defined more 
precisely in the 1976–77 seminar “Théorie et pratique,” an important part of 
which is dedicated to the concept of production in the Marxist and Heideggerian 
discourses. The verb déborder is difficult to translate. It can mean “overflowing,” 
“going over the brim,” “over the edge”—a river déborde. A child might be careful 
not to go over the edge when she is coloring in, out of fear that her parents tell her 
“ça déborde.” Déborder can also have a temporal meaning, as in “going over time.” 
In the military or strategic language, déborder signifies “outflanking” the troops of 
 
11 This is why the monster, “absolute monstrosity,” by essence without essence, unrecognizable, 
irreproducible, must remain foreign to the biological discourse—or to any ontological discourse 
taking as its object the truth of being, for that matter. See Derrida 2019a: 123; 2020: 88–89. I have 
more to say about the monster (and the mutant) in the work of Foucault, Derrida, and Malabou in 
Mercier 2019b. 
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the enemy. The term can be used similarly in the language of chess, or soccer, for 
instance, when a player déborde (outflanks) an opponent. The noun débordements, 
usually pluralized, suggests the event of something relatively unpredictable that 
takes the authorities by surprise—for instance, a political demonstration or a 
public gathering can be followed by débordements, which suggests a somewhat 
violent and illegal behavior, at least some manifestations of violence that take 
place in the margins of the law, and in the margins of the demonstration “itself.” 
In a similar way, the term can designate behaviors deemed excessive or abnormal, 
as in débordements outranciers or débordements d’affection. When used as an adjective in 
the passive voice, débordé usually has negative connotations: être débordé signifies “to 
be overwhelmed,” “overworked,” as a philosophy teacher can sometimes be when 
they are required to give a seminar—something which is illustrated by this 
quotation from the 1976–77 seminar “Théorie et pratique,” recently translated by 
David Wills as Theory and Practice: 
We are over the edge [Nous sommes débordés]. Whence our fatigue. 
We are truly over the edge. 
Truly. Truly, which doesn’t qualify the way in which we would be over 
the edge, truly over the edge, because to tell the truth perhaps we are not at all 
over the edge, in truth [nous ne le sommes peut-être pas du tout, débordés, en verité]. 
“Truly” means rather that if there is going over the edge [débordement], if there is 
an overflowing effect, it is an effect of truth. It is in the name of truth that it 
always overflows [C’est au nom de la verité que ça déborde toujours]. (Derrida 1976–77; 
2019b: 83) 
But the reference to débordement can also have positive connotations, especially 
when the term is used in the active voice of present participle, as when one refers 
to someone as débordant or débordante de vitalité. A person, a place, a city, a work can 
be said to be d’une vitalité débordante. 
In Derrida’s writings, and in particular those of the 1970s, the motif of 
débordement, débord, gestures toward everything that overflows, goes over the edge, 
out of frame, while remaining somewhat attached to the edge, within/without the 
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frame: text and context, the title, the signature, margins and marginalia, the 
legend, the parergon, borderlines or journal de bord, and so on: “That irreducible 
analogy is what impels me to pose the question of the edge [bord]: each time there 
is overflow [chaque fois que ça déborde] it resembles what is overflowed [débordé], 
overflowing [le débordant] remains in affinity with what is overflowed [débordé], 
affined and I’ll even say confined to what is overflowed” (Derrida 1976–77; 
2019b: 86). The débord—which can also designate the sewn border of a garment’s 
lining, or the edge of a road— is thus within/without, inside/outside; it necessarily 
shares traits with the débordé. It marks and re-marks the border; it retraces the edge 
and the line that it crosses in the débordement. As such, the débordant cannot not 
reproduce something of the débordé. This is why Derrida, in Theory and Practice, is 
explicitly suspicious of Heidegger’s claim to exceed (déborder) the opposition 
between theory and practice, or of Althusser’s claim that Theory with a capital T 
exceeds and déborde the field of philosophy (see for example Derrida 2019b: 71 and 
86). The law of débordement, just like that of text, translation, writing-reading, 
introduces a “logic” that is different from that of re-production, but that does not 
simply do away with re-production. Débordement is neither simply production nor 
simply reproduction. It is something else—a structure or law of différance that is 
often associated by Derrida with the “general text,” understood as débordement or 
self-débordement.12 In this perspective, débordement could be considered as a sort of 
watchword of deconstruction—but because of its disseminating polysemy, due to 
the multiplicity of its potential equivalents, the lexical field of bord, débord, déborder, 
débordement sometimes goes unnoticed and often disappears or becomes scattered in 
English translations, re-pro-traduit, or repro-translated, into a plurality of rough 
equivalents: excess, overflowing, transgression, going over the edge, the brim, 
brimming up or brimming over, and so on. 
 
12 See for instance Derrida 1972a: xix; 1972b: 81–82. 
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Even though Derrida’s work on re-production in the “La vie la mort” 
seminar targets in the first place the biological concept of reproduction (deemed 
“sexual” or not) and concerns itself with life sciences inasmuch as they define the 
essence of life as self-reproduction, Derrida refuses to limit this analysis to the so-
called biological field. Débordement is the structure of the field. In the course of the 
seminar, and more particularly in sessions 4 to 6, Derrida shows how the 
deconstruction of the model of re-production, of re-production as model, déborde 
the biological field and contributes to deconstruct other oppositions, such as life 
and death, the sexual and the nonsexual, nature and culture, physis and technē, or 
(living) animals and (nonliving) machines, heredity and inheritance, and so on.13 
This is done by interrogating the logic of re-production as modelizing tool, as a 
textual device that travels between the various fields of inquiry that might recur to 
it. Derrida goes to show that the logic of re-production is the model, the very 
essence of modelization, inasmuch as modelization implies re-production and 
reproduces the ontological, philosophical discourse of the essence: 
not only does Jacob not break purely and simply with the philosophical discourse 
on essence but he ends up returning, with this essence of life as tendency and 
capacity for reproduction, not only, I would say, to essence but also to the 
essentiality of essence, the origin and end of essence as [the] dynamics and energy 
of being, that which gives the power and actuality of being, maximal being, and 
which . . . assures from the inside its own production, that is, its re-production. 
(Derrida 2019a: 121–22; 2020: 87)  
In this perspective, re-production is itself the model of the model, that is, the onto-
logic of the essence understood as potentiality and actuality of being, such as 
philosophical discourse has defined it. The model defining life as self-reproduction 
espouses the structure of the essence, thus confirming philosophical discourse to be 
the discourse on the essence, on truth as essence—by definition a reproducible 
essence. But this model is not limited to life sciences: it traverses and exceeds all 
 
13 For an in-depth analysis of the “La vie la mort” seminar, see Vitale 2018, 2019. 
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the fields which recur to the genetic onto-logic of re-production, according to the 
general law of débordement I described a moment ago. Every time a discourse, any 
discourse, recurs to the logic of re-production, it also reproduces the philosophical 
logic or model of essentiality described above by Derrida. This is why the notion 
of model (just like that of analogy) is so important in the 1975–76 seminar. The 
different “models” of re-production or reproductive systems—biological 
reproduction, socioeconomic and ideological reproduction, technological 
reproduction, ontological reproduction, and so on—these different models in fact 
require each other: they are the model of each other, the analogy or the metaphor 
of each other, so that the model of reproduction is itself the model—the model of 
reproduction is reproduction, another reproduction, a reproduction that translates 
itself into another reproduction, and potentially involving at every turn, virtually 
or in actuality, reduction, traduction (translation), transduction, induction, 
deduction, education (itself derived from ex-ducere), conduite or conduction, 
seduction, and so on.14 
 
14 It is interesting to note that the connection that chains these words together in the French 
language through their root “duction” (duco, ducere: to draw, to lead) is not quite translatable into 
English, precisely because traduction, as it must be translated as “translation,” loses its connection to 
“production,” “reproduction,” “education,” “seduction,” and so on. The duction is lost in 
translation. The consequences of these untranslatable differences between tra-duction and trans-
lation are probably enormous, notably because translation, unlike traduction, preserves a reference to the 
supine of fero (latum), and thus to reference, transference, and difference. The word translation 
(transportation, displacement) exists in French, but it is rare and no longer used to speak of 
“translation.” Although I certainly do not feel able to draw all the consequences from it, I am very 
grateful to Adam R. Rosenthal for having drawn my attention to this problem of untranslatability at 
the locus of translation/traduction. It is at least one instance in which the words translation and 
traduction cannot simply be translated into each other and cannot be considered as pure 
synonyms—supposing the words are synonym to themselves in the first place. . . Let’s note in 
passing that, in The Truth in Painting, which was first published in French in 1978, Derrida 
interrogated the lexicon and the whole logic of “duction,” derived from duco, ducere—what he calls 
“the system of duction (production, reproduction, induction, reduction, etc.)” (Derrida 1987: 10). 
This is done more particularly in the text “Cartouches,” in which Derrida tries to approach 
Gérard Titus-Carmel’s artwork. Derrida describes his inability to find the words to speak about it: 
“The glossary or array I’m dealing with at the moment (tire, tirer, tiroir, tirage [draw, to draw, 
drawer, drawing]) leads to that of the trait, it induces, precisely, duction, and even the ‘ductus,’ the 
idiomatic trait by which one recognizes a draftsman even before he signs his name (it is this ‘ductus’ 
I won’t manage to talk about here)” (192).  Something (remains) resists—déborde: “No word will 
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Each model of reproduction déborde its own conceptuality, its own field of 
inscription, and this débordement is performed in the text of the seminars I am 
talking about here: while deconstructing the logic or onto-logic of “re-production” 
as model, relentlessly, year after year, Derrida also deconstructs the programme of 
agrégation, and the logic of “selecting” themes or “notions” as if they could 
designate separate fields of inquiry for the philosophical discourse (and for the 
disciplines or subdisciplines that might partake in those fields): “art,” “law and 
politics,” “life and death,” “society,” “religion,” and so on. Across the years, from 
one session to another, Derrida’s seminar se déborde, spills over itself or folds over 
onto itself and, in doing so, performs, puts in practice the deconstruction of the 
institutional system within which it is inscribed (starting with the agrégation 
concours), as well as of the different fields or subfields (philosophy of law, of 
education, aesthetics, political philosophy, philosophy of science, of religion, and 
so on) that the Western philosophical canon aims to codify, over which it tends to 
establish its authority by defining their limits and objects, their protocols of truth-
making, and their conditions of scientificity. In other words, by deconstructing the 
logic of re-production inasmuch as it traverses and déborde fields of inquiry that are 
apparently separate, Derrida not only interrogates the borders and limits between 
the “fields” which are being examined but also deconstructs the philosophical 
gesture which tends to ensure its own mastery over these disciplines or 
subdisciplines by dividing between those fields, by defining their objects and area 
of expertise, and thus by imposing a certain division of labor. This division of labor, 
the definition and stabilization of different fields of inquiry, is essential to the 
reproduction and perpetuation of the philosophical system itself. Western 
 
have been ductile enough, especially not the words ‘production,’ ‘reproduction,’ ‘seduction,’ 
‘reduction.’ Duction is no longer sufficient for it” (195). It is noteworthy that, perhaps oddly, 
Derrida does not mention traduction in that text. The motif of débordement, however, is at work in all 
the texts included in The Truth in Painting. Débordement is also a decisive motif in Signéponge and in the 
texts collected in Parages—most notably “Survivre/Journal de bord”—which were all written 
around the same period, in the 1970s (Derrida 1984, 1986). 
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philosophy, in its metaphysical or ontological expression, is the reproductive 
system, and it reproduces itself through the production of subordinate disciplines 
or subdisciplines, all collected under the phantasmatic control of the philosophical 
institution “itself,” which presents itself as their origin and end by giving itself the 
power to legislate over their territories. This self-reproductive gesture always 
supposes the phantasmatic authority of a paternity claim. And one of the main 
resources of this phallogocentric, imperial, philosophical drive is education.15 
Se/ductions: Reading—Divisions of Labor and Sexual Differences 
With all this in mind, I now return to the 1974–75 seminar “GREPH, le concept 
de l’idéologie chez les idéologues français.” Although it inscribes itself in the 
sequence described above, I do not wish to erase its singularity in that series. In 
fact, Derrida emphasizes the singularity of that pedagogical scene on the very first 
page of the seminar:16 
after approximately 15 years of teaching practice and 23 years as a civil servant, I 
am only beginning to interrogate, exhibit, and critique systematically (it is the 
systematic character that is important if one does not want to remain content 
with empirical skirmishes, scrapes which do not shake or transform the system in 
place, and which, on the contrary, make up part of its self-critical reproduction, 
self-critical reproduction being perhaps the very element of philosophical 
tradition and conservation . . .), I am only beginning, so late, to interrogate, 
exhibit, and critique systematically—in view of a transformation—the very 
borders [les bords même] of that within which I was until now casting [coulais] my 
discourse. (Derrida 1974–75: session 1, page 1) 
 
15 This is why the deconstruction of philosophy always has to do with education; it must target 
teaching and the pedagogical institution: “the deconstruction of phallogocentrism as the 
deconstruction of the onto-theological principle, of metaphysics, of the question ‘What is?,’ of the 
subordination of all the fields of questioning to the onto-encyclopedic instance, and so forth, such a 
deconstruction tackles the root of the universitas: the root of philosophy as teaching, the ultimate 
unity of the philosophical, of the philosophical discipline or the philosophical university as the basis 
of every university. The university is philosophy. A university is always the construction of a 
philosophy” (Derrida 2002: 73). 
16 Parts of the first and second sessions of the seminar were revised and published as “Where a 
Teaching Body Begins and How It Ends” (Derrida 1990, 2002). The rest of the seminar was never 
published. I’ve translated all quotations from this seminar. 
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This passage is followed by a sort of self-justification. Derrida attempts to justify 
why deconstruction did not address earlier the discourses of sociology or economy, 
and why it did not raise more explicitly sociopolitical and institutional questions—
more particularly in their Marxist form. (Remember that “society” was the theme 
of the agrégation program that year.) This justification has to do with the expression 
of what I would call a double anxiety with respect to “reproduction,” in particular 
the type of “reproduction” associated with education and “the teaching body,” le 
corps enseignant. On the one hand, Derrida clearly states that he does not want to 
“reproduce” the classical, framing logic—“la logique classique du cadre”—which 
governs the tradition of social or political critique. But on the other hand, he 
suggests that the concept, the model of “reproduction” is itself an effect of the 
logic that must be deconstructed (Derrida 2002: 72). As if the logic of 
reproduction, including its denunciation in critical-Marxist form—for instance, 
Althusser’s theory of Ideological State Apparatuses (ISAs)—were in fact a resource 
for reproduction, and for the reproduction of philosophy understood as the 
discourse of self-critical reproduction.17 
 
17 This concern is echoed in the statement Derrida made in 1980 during his thesis defense, later 
published as “Punctuations: The Time of a Thesis.” There, Derrida explains that it is useless to 
denounce the violence of social and institutional reproduction—for example, in the form of a 
discourse coded as “revolutionary”—if said discourse espouses the dominant forms and codes of 
the institution, thus accommodating the “reproductive force of authority.” Although Derrida is 
speaking here about the authority of philosophy and of its institution (chiefly, the university), he 
also stresses the broader political implications of his remarks: 
if I say that politics was also involved it is because, in this case, the political does not take 
only the conventional distribution along a left/right axis. The reproductive force of 
authority can get along more comfortably with declarations or theses whose encoded 
content presents itself as revolutionary, provided that they respect the rites of legitimation, 
the rhetoric and the institutional symbolism that defuses and neutralizes everything that 
comes from outside the system. What is unacceptable is what, underlying positions or 
theses, upsets this deeply entrenched contract, the order of these norms, and that does so 
in the very form of the work, of teaching or of writing. (Derrida 2004: 122) 
This passage nicely summarizes Derrida’s attitude toward Marxism in the 1960s and 1970s. For 
more details on Derrida’s relationship with Marxist thought and politics—in particular 
Althusser’s—in the 1960s and 1970s, see Mercier 2020b. 
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Since it is impossible to summarize the “GREPH” seminar within the 
limits of this essay, I will focus on a number of elements concerning Derrida’s 
deconstruction of the logic of reproduction.18 In the seminar, Derrida is 
particularly attentive to the fact that classical-liberal economists—notably 
Condillac, Adam Smith, Destutt de Tracy, Jean-Baptiste Say, Ricardo, who 
advocate for socioeconomic reproduction—and Marxists and critical 
sociologists—Marx and Engels, Gramsci, Althusser, Balibar, Buci-Glucksmann, 
Bourdieu, who denounce said reproduction—share the same network of concepts: 
production and reproduction, capital, labor, ideology, and dualisms such as 
family/society, nature/culture, life/technique, animal/man, ideality/materiality, 
intellectual/material labor, theory/praxis, and so on. In particular, Derrida shows 
that Marxist concepts partly reproduce classical philosophemes and entertain, more 
specifically, a relationship to the Hegelian system which remains uninterrogated, 
and which affects their conception of education (and of the philosophical 
institution) as essentially reproductive. 
In the fifth session, Derrida proceeds to read and analyze in detail 
Althusser’s 1970 text on ISAs, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes 
towards an Investigation)” (which was later reproduced and translated in 
Althusser 2014). On page 5, Derrida introduces this reading by exposing a certain 
number of contextual elements. He recalls “the common use, today, in the 
language of a certain intelligentsia, of the word reproduction in order to designate 
the effect of teaching apparatuses, and of ideological apparatuses in general” 
(Derrida 1974–75: session 5, page 5);19 he evokes “Bourdieu and Passeron’s works, 
who have made of Reproduction not only the title of one of their books, but in fact 
 
18 For a detailed description and analysis of this unpublished seminar, see Mercier 2019a, 2020a. 
19 Here, Derrida added a handwritten marginal note: “Value of productivity = general 
philosophical consensus (Deleuze ⇒ Marx…)” (Derrida 1974–75: session 5, page 5). The reference 
to Deleuze most likely refers to his (and Guattari’s) definition of “desire” as “production” in Anti-
Oedipus. 
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the very field of their analyses” (ibid.);20 and he finally turns to Althusser’s text, 
which proposes to think ideology and ISAs scientifically, that is to say, “from the point 
of view of reproduction” (Althusser 2014: 236–38). Derrida is particularly interested in 
Althusser’s critique of ideology inasmuch as it is inseparable from a study of the 
school system, of “the educational ISA.” Althusser shows that the reproduction of 
capital and of class domination supposes not only the reproduction of material 
resources, but also that of a number of skills, competences, and orthodoxies that 
are necessary for the reproduction of docile human resources, and which 
contribute to reproduce the division of labor and class divisions. Althusser explains 
that this type of ideological reproduction—through language teaching and moral 
and civic instruction, for instance—cannot be conceived in purely mechanistic 
terms, notably because it supposes internal and external (class) struggles, within 
the apparatus and between the various ideological apparatuses (between the “ISA 
Family” and the “ISA School,” for example, or between the “ISA School” and the 
“ISA Church,” etc.). Nevertheless, the educational ISA is central to Althusser’s 
theory of ideology: it is defined as the dominant ISA in “mature capitalist social 
formations,” where it replaced the ISA Church in this dominant function 
sometime in the nineteenth century (according to a timeline that Althusser does 
not provide—see Althusser 2014: 249). 
Although Derrida recognizes the undeniable progress that Althusser’s 
theory of ISAs constitutes compared with other (Lucien Sève’s, for example) 
Marxist theories of education—notably because it attempts to account for a 
certain conflictuality and plurality inherent to the reproduction of ideology—he 
remains suspicious of Althusser’s discourse inasmuch as it is captive to the notion 
that ideology can be analyzed from the point of view of a science of ideology, for 
instance in the form of a “scientific theory of the state” (Althusser 2014: 241), or of 
 
20 See Bourdieu and Passeron 1990. Their book La reproduction was first published in French in 
1970. 
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a “scientific discourse on ideology”: “from within ideology we have to outline a 
discourse which tries to break with ideology, in order to dare to be the beginning 
of a scientific (i.e. subject-less) discourse on ideology” (Althusser 2014: 263). And 
this scientific theory is possible, according to Althusser, precisely because it 
presents itself as a theory of reproduction—a reproductive model that cannot not 
reproduce a certain mechanistic functioning. However, Derrida asks: How can the 
apparatus reproduce itself while the resources of its functioning as reproductive machine 
are—as Althusser himself explains— numerous, heterogeneous, proteiform, and 
involve a multiplicity of conflictual forces, reversals, delays, relays, and mutations? 
The formation of ideological apparatuses supposes a long and complex history—a 
history itself heterogeneous and agonistic, resulting from the relative stabilization 
of struggles between a multitude of ideological apparatuses, discourses, and 
interpretations thereof, concerning and affecting the very concept of history, and 
which Derrida analyzes in detail all through the seminar. Still in the fifth session, 
Derrida demonstrates that the construction and identification of “the apparatus,” 
its “production” as a theoretical object for critique—its identification as an object 
available for critical theory—is itself an effect of the apparatus. The critique of the 
apparatus is an effect of the apparatus. Therefore, the critique of ideology cannot 
escape a certain ideological becoming, of which we are also the effects, so that the 
deconstruction of ideology itself partakes in the apparatus that is being 
deconstructed, which in fact deconstructs itself. This signifies that there is no pure 
and simple exit from the apparatus and its reproduction: the deconstruction of 
ideology is possible only because it is, in part, an effect of the apparatus that is 
being deconstructed, and this partaking is what opens the possibility of reading, while 
also limiting it in other aspects. This partaking supposes a differantial complicity 
with the so-called apparatus (which, in any case, does not designate a 
homogeneous whole or the concept of something homogeneous)—and this 
differantial complicity requires an intervention within the apparatus, through the 
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invention of new practices and interpretative models aiming to deconstruct the 
apparatus inasmuch as it re-presents itself as re-productive machine. This is, once 
again, the law of text and débordement—neither pure production nor pure 
reproduction. 
In the eighth and ninth sessions of the seminar, in a stunning reading of 
Marx and Engels’s The German Ideology—one which was never reproduced in later 
publications—Derrida complicates the traditional Marxist schema of reproduction 
in several crucial ways, which all have to do with a certain reading of sexual 
difference. In The German Ideology, the concepts of division of labor and ideology 
(which are inseparable in the Marxian text) presuppose another division of labor, 
presented as more “originary” and “natural”: what Marx calls “the division of 
labor in the sexual act” (die Teilung der Arbeit im Geschlechtsakt) (qtd. in Derrida 1974–
75: session 9). Derrida explains that it is difficult to comprehend what Marx 
exactly means by this: does he refer to the sexual “act”—the coitus, properly 
speaking—or to the whole organization of sexual re-production, the distribution of 
labor between sexes within the familial structures, and the traditional, dual 
definition of sexes? In any case, the definition of the sexual division of labor as 
“natural” and “originary” tends to espouse classical Hegelian schemes by 
reproducing traditional oppositions such as family/society, nature/culture, 
animality/humanity, and so on. Although Marx explains that the sexual division 
of labor itself already presupposes dialectical relations between agonistic forces, he 
maintains the naturalness of sexuality as production and reproduction, conceived 
as preceding society, politics, and the class struggle, properly speaking. Marx 
posits the sexual division of labor as pre-ideological, pre-social, and pre-political. 
According to Derrida, this position shows that the dialectical-Marxist theory of 
reproduction (including Althusser’s) requires sexual difference (which might seem 
quite obvious), while also reducing it to a mere moment within the general process 
of reproduction. This reduction contributes to localizing and stabilizing sexual 
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difference, to reducing sex and sexual differences to a simple means of production 
and reproduction. 
Nevertheless, because it is inscribed in the dialectical process of 
production-reproduction as its origin, this sexual division becomes very hard to 
fully delimit and stabilize: Is it simply “natural,” or is it also cultural-ideological? Is 
it biological or sociopolitical? Is it even human, strictly speaking? Is it simply 
reducible to the traditional duality of sexes? Can it be defined and localized in 
ontological terms? Does it have a stable essence, and how does it affect the logic of 
socioeconomic reproduction as a whole? In fact, Derrida suggests that Marx’s 
presupposition of this originary sexual division of labor tends to wreak havoc on 
the whole Marxian system as theory of re-production. It is obvious that the 
originary sexual difference, since it is described as originary division of labor, cannot 
be abolished in the same way that the secondary division of labor (between material 
and intellectual labor) should (and will) be abolished according to Marx’s eschato-
teleology. This supposes a first difficulty: because (sexual) division of labor is 
“originary” and “natural,” because it has always already started, this signifies that 
there will always be some level of division of labor, some differential division of 
labor that will repeat or reproduce itself, even though it reproduces itself in 
différance, practically transforming labor in and through all its divisions. Labor 
divides (itself) in and through reproduction; there is no labor without division. 
Labor is essentially division, or divisibility. Labor divides (itself), differs (from 
itself), and this differantial division or self-division is the condition of possibility 
and impossibility for reproduction in general. Derrida thus demonstrates that 
Marx tends to give to the concepts of “labor” and “division of labor” a virtually 
unlimited extension, which cannot simply be contained within the limits of a 
regional field (such as “the economy” in the narrow sense of the term). 
Now, if we take seriously the fact that the “originary” division of labor is 
defined by Marx as sexual, we must also admit that this sexual division concerns 
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and affects all production and all labor deriving from this “origin”: manual 
and/or intellectual, material and/or ideological, practical and/or theoretical, and 
so on.21 Sexual division (and its underlying conflictuality) must affect the whole of 
the re-productive system and becomes virtually limitless, thus making the limits 
between family, society, state, school, religion, and all other “apparatuses” 
tremble. Derrida names this general structure the “ideological-sexual 
organization” of the socius, and postulates what he calls an “agonistic différance”: 
a nonderivable and nonreducible divisibility, a multiplicity of sexual-material-
textual differantial forces affecting and traversing all the concepts at play here, and 
challenging the stabilization of “politics,” “economy,” “sexuality,” or “ideology” 
into ontological categories that could be strictly delimited (Derrida 1974–75: 
session 9). Through the postulation of this “agonistic différance,” Derrida then 
proceeds to articulate the Marxist discourse on labor, division, class conflict, and 
ideology with the psychoanalytic questions of sexuality, the unconscious, the 
phantasm, the economy of the drives, repression, the uncanny, and so on. From 
the point of view of ideology and its reproduction, Derrida’s pre-ontological 
“agonistic différance” implies, first, that the structure of the ideological cannot 
strictly reproduce itself, that it is itself nonhomogeneous, that it exists in différance, 
as a heterogeneous system of sexual, economic, cultural, or textual traces; and, 
second, that the ideological can never be simply explained away, “reduced” or 
“abolished” once and for all, but that its structure remains to be translated, 
 
21 Derrida refers to this aspect of the argument “two years” later, in the seminar “Theory and 
Practice” (1976–77), in another example of textual renvoi or débordement from one seminar to the 
other: “if sexual practice is not one example of practice among others, then you’ll get the sense 
here that the question of work and of the division of labor, and of the sexual division of labor 
within the Marxist problematic, a set of questions that we looked into together here two years ago, this set of 
questions that we will find again is indeed a systematic set and not localizable as particular or 
derivative” (Derrida 2019b: 31; my emphasis). In the French and English editions of Theory and 
Practice, a footnote mentions that Derrida is referring to the seminar “L’art (Kant),” but it is most 
certainly the one we are talking about here. 
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transformed, and deconstructed22—while always maintaining a link to originary 
(pre-ontological) sexual différance. 
Let me add one last remark about what Marx’s account of sex and 
Geschlechtsakt does to dialectics (and philosophy) as reproductive system: sexuality 
being defined as originary labor and division of labor, it contaminates the whole of 
the system which supposedly reproduces itself from this so-called “origin.” In the 
process, the “origin” must reproduce itself. The (sexual) division of labor cannot 
not reproduce itself, but it reproduces itself as difference, in différance, always 
presupposing a certain agonistic differential, a conflict between forces. Sexual 
divisions crosscut and divide all other divisions. The agonistic sexual division is 
required and reproduced in and through the secondary division of labor—class 
division in the “strict” sense of the term, starting with the division between 
intellectual and material labor, which in turn produces ideology. This signifies that 
divisions of labor, class divisions, the production of ideology, and more generally 
the whole re-productive system, are in fact always already sexual, sexualized, or 
sexualizing; they are marked sexually, originarily affected by the sexual division—a 
sexual division or difference which cannot simply be stabilized or captured, 
comprehended by the ontological discourse of philosophy, since this discourse is 
 
22 Could it be said that Derrida’s line of argumentation in this last session of the seminar was partly 
prompted by Bourdieu’s sociological critique of philosophical ideology, such as presented by him 
earlier during the same seminar? It is hard to tell, of course, because there are no explicit signs of 
this in the text of the seminar “itself.” But we cannot exclude the possibility that Derrida reacted to a 
certain number of debates internal and external to the seminar, and adapted his teaching from one 
session to the other—something which, I insist, is harder to take into account if we simply read the 
seminars as books, and not as archival-pedagogic documents. For example, in Bourdieu’s 
“L’ontologie politique de Martin Heidegger,” one finds the following argument, which targets the 
ideological nature of the philosophical discourse in general: “An ideological production is all the 
more successful as it is more capable to put in the wrong anyone who attempts to reduce it to its 
objective truth: what is proper to dominant ideology is its capacity to make the science of ideology 
fall under the accusation of ideology” (Bourdieu 1975: 119; my translation). This passage was 
heavily modified from 1975 to 1988, and thus does not appear as such in the English translation of 
the 1988 book. One can imagine what Derrida would have to say about the expression “science of 
ideology,” and about Bourdieu’s dogmatic claim to operate a “reduction” of ideology (here, 
philosophy) to “its objective truth” (that is, class interests)—here again: re/pro/ductions. 
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itself the (ideological) product of the series of (socio-economic-sexual) divisions of 
labor identified by Marx, and of their underlying conflicts. It follows that there 
cannot be any neutral and nonideological theoretical discourse on sexual 
difference: sexual difference or différance does not let itself be reduced to a 
theoretical object available to a neutral theoretical discourse, nor does it let itself 
be reduced to the essence of a being-present—although (or because) it originarily 
affects the position of the philosophical discourse on the essence, and of the onto-
logic of re-production that goes with it. (Sexual) différance déborde ontology, while 
not being strictly or purely external to it; and ontology, the philosophical discourse 
on the essence— here in the form of dialectics—can only attempt to re-duce 
(sexual) différance to a process of re-production. 
All this leads to considering Derrida’s deconstruction of the sexual politics 
of ontology (through the notion of dissemination, for example, understood as that 
which does not return to the Father) as a radicalization of the Marxian critique of 
ideology in relation to production and reproduction. Deconstruction always 
targets an authoritative and seminal father figure, a power principle, be it logos, 
the state, or the onto-logic mastery of philosophy, which performs its own 
sovereignty by positing itself as a discourse on the origin and truth of being—a 
truth whose essence is to be reproducible, to reproduce itself, notably through 
education. The onto-logic of re-production always works in neutralizing the work 
of dissemination, in attempting to re-duce the irreducible heterogeneity of the 
disseminal text. As Peggy Kamuf explains, it is probable that this disseminal force, 
which interrupts the reproductive machine, always retains some reference to some 
sexual difference or différance, to some “sextual drive” at work in all the models and 
reproductive systems we are talking about here—but which can never be fully 
stabilized by them: 
That probability is even a certainty if one takes as seriously as one should 
dissemination as Derrida has described it and which he understands to be at work 
in every text as its possibility, that is, the possibility of its coming to find a reader. 
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This term can still be heard in its so-called sexual (that is, genital) sense: a dis-
semination, where the prefix has a privative value. It would be a non-semination, 
a non-generative non-reproduction of the seed and the semen, which is the 
masculine essence. But the word has not just a privative sense, because it also says 
dissemination, the scattering of the semantic or semiotic value of signs. Between 
these levels, between the body of signs and the genitally sexed body, the act of 
semination is itself dis-seminated, meaning it does not reproduce itself, no “itself” 
can reproduce itself. (Kamuf 2001: 88) 
Just as the text’s functioning depends on the reader to come, the teaching 
discourse finds meaning only in the response. This—which remains scandalous for 
any onto-logic—will always be surprising, even to the most sophisticated models of 
re-production. The overflowing surprise comes from the unpredictable other—
today’s or tomorrow’s readers, for instance. But the overflowing already takes 
place in the classroom, in the singular event of the pedagogical scene. It interrupts in 
advance the teaching discourse and the seminal scene of the seminar. The teacher, 
and the reproductive system to which he or she belongs, cannot not be débordés. 
Certainly, this débordement might point to the defeat of the Master, to the defect of 
the reproductive machine and of the inseminating function of the seminar. For the 
teacher, débordement is surely a source of fatigue, perhaps of discouragement. It 
signals a certain powerlessness, or impouvoir. But such depowering débordement also 
suggests a generative or affirmative force of dissemination, the chance of a 
dispossession, the surprise of a reversal—one which might constitute, somewhat 
perversely, a source of pleasure for the teacher, but a pleasure that remains 
entrusted to the other: un plaisir débordé-débordant: 
Hence I never fail to be surprised when I give a course. Surprise is that structure 
that draws metalanguage back, that always surprises it in its naiveté, surprises it at 
the moment of its withdrawal [retraite], . . . and it procures, so long as this surprise 
is affirmed and reaffirmed by whoever has the force to give in to it in the end, 
pleasure, a pleasure that, in keeping with the essence of pleasure or of desire, 
must be and remain dubious, entrusted to the other to take or to leave. One never 
knows where a course will go. That of which one speaks and those to whom one 
speaks always have in reserve something to say in advance not only about the 
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